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Abstract—Many adult content websites incorporate social net-
working features. Although these are popular, they raise signifi-
cant challenges, including the potential for users to “catfish”, i.e.,
to create fake profiles to deceive other users. This paper takes an
initial step towards automated catfish detection. We explore the
characteristics of the different age and gender groups, identifying
a number of distinctions. Through this, we train models based
on user profiles and comments, via the ground truth of specially
verified profiles. When applying our models for age and gender
estimation to unverified profiles, 38% of profiles are classified as
lying about their age, and 25% are predicted to be lying about
their gender. The results suggest that women have a greater
propensity to catfish than men. Our preliminary work has notable
implications on operators of such online social networks, as well
as users who may worry about interacting with catfishes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adult content has been a long standing innovator in tech-
nology. Whereas, originally, online adult content was primarily
distributed via pay-per-view sites and peer-to-peer networks,
we have recently witnessed a radical shift termed “Porn 2.0”
with the integration of diverse features into popular portals,
e.g., videos, images, webcams and chat functionality. For
example, many now support user-generated content (UGC),
as well as video commenting and rating. These services have
exploded in popularity, yet research has not kept pace with
their advancement.
One of the most powerful features introduced is that of
online social networking (OSNs). Adult OSNs, much like
Facebook, allow users to create and interconnect social pro-
files. Anecdotally, these profiles have led to a plethora of fake
accounts created by users in an attempt to deceive others re-
garding their true identity — so called “catfishing” [1]. In this
paper, we restrict ourselves to two forms of identity deception:
users lying about either their gender or age (or both). Although
we do not take a moral position about catfishing and perhaps
in many cases it does not harm users, there is also a significant
subset of situations in which such fake accounts could directly
damage others (or themselves). For example, catfishes may
pretend to be younger than their true age in an attempt to
attract partners; similarly, younger users may pretend to be
older to avoid legal age filters. Alternatively, men may pretend
to be (homosexual) women in an attempt to garner more
female friends [2]. Indeed, our exploration of one such Porn
2.0 OSN userbase reveals that certain demographics do excel
in terms of popularity metrics (§IV), potentially motivating
deceit. Thus, any mechanism to detect such deception would
have significant value to both the OSN operators and users
concerned about being deceived.
In this paper we ask to what extent does catfishing occur,
and also is it possible to automatically detect them? As a
first step towards answering this, we study the PornHub adult
OSN. We have crawled the PornHub website recording all data
from 99,727 OSN profiles (§III). PornHub incorporates some
of the most sophisticated social networking features seen in
the domain, including the ability to form friendships, upload
and share content, send messages and post on each others’
“walls”. This makes it ideal as a case-study for analysis.
A particularly novel feature of PornHub is the ability to
create “verified” profiles that are manually checked by Porn-
Hub employees. This gives a unique ground truth of accurate
profiles. Using this data, we characterise the activities of these
different genders and age groups to observe notable differences
(§IV). With these analyses, we move on to explore several
algorithms to detect users lying about their age and/or gender
(§V). Using well recognised state-of-the-art techniques [3],
[4], and with an additional set of features, we build models
to predict true user demographics (gender and age). These
predictions allow us to identify unverified users whose listed
demographics deviate from the prediction (i.e., users who are
potentially catfishing). Although this approach lacks a ground
truth and should therefore be treated with caution, it does
provide a first step towards exploring trends.
With this subset of profiles classified as catfishes, we then
begin to explore their characteristics (§VI). We compute pop-
ularity metrics (e.g., number of friends) for users predicted to
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be catfishes to find that they tend to gain larger friendship and
subscription groups. Although this metric may be skewed by
the possibility of catfishes being more proactive in befriending
others, we also note that catfishes gain more profile views as
well (a metric which is more difficult to game as it depends
on others choosing to visit your page). We surmise that the
increasing integration of our offline and online personas will
result in this becoming even more important (§VII). Of course,
although catfish detection may be more explicitly required in
adult portals, our methods will also have benefits for various
other services, e.g., online dating and mentorship.
The contributions and roadmap of this work is as follows:
• We present the first work to explore the presence of cat-
fishes on adult OSNs (§IV), making our dataset available
for public use1 (§III).
• We build classifiers for age estimation and gender predic-
tion for adult OSN users, and compare various features
for achieving the best performance (§V).
• We profile the demographics and activities of users clas-
sified as catfishes, highlighting how they differ from other
users, and benefit from their deception (§VI).
II. RELATED WORK
Pornography is anecdotally the most searched for content
on the web. Whereas work has gone into understanding the
sociological aspects of sexual activities [5], [6], little is known
about the online engines that enable its distribution, especially
the expanding “Porn 2.0” phenomenon. Numerous YouTube-
like websites have emerged (e.g., PornHub, YouPorn), with
in-built social features. Recent work [7] recorded over 60
billion views on one such Porn 2.0 website, whilst another
study found that some adult video sites can even exceed the
traffic footprint of traditional video sites [8].
A novel requirement that stands out in this domain is the
need for robust demographics verification. This is particularly
driven by the potential incentives for people to deceive others
about their true gender and age. There have been a number
of recent studies looking at the automated verification of
demographics [9], [10], [11]. For instance, [3], [12] utilised
textual features including text content, part-of-speech (POS)
tags, and discourse styles to train a model using linear regres-
sion for age prediction. They tested their approach on three
different collections including online forums. They managed
to achieve an age prediction with correlation 0.535 and mean-
absolute-error (MAE) in age of 6.5 years. In an extension to
their work [4], they applied their methods on Twitter data,
and achieved a MAE of 4.1, which was shown to be better
than human estimation of age. In another study, [13] utilised
profile and network information for age and gender prediction.
The results show that network information leads to significant
improvement in prediction, and they explain it as a reason
of the principle of homophily of Twitter users. Unlike the
above studies, We do not strive to make a contribution to
the algorithmic detection of users lying about demographics.
1http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/wmagdy/resources.htm
Instead, we exploit these existing state-of-the-art methods and
apply them to this new and important domain. This is a
topic of increasing importance, with countries such as the UK
proposing mandatory age-checks for such websites [14].
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no prior work
focusing on demographic verification within the adult domain,
although various works have focused on related components
of Porn 2.0, such as pornographic practices, communities and
subcultures [15]; interest recommendations [16]; dating ser-
vices [17], [18]; user commenting [19]; content popularity [20]
and illegal content dissemination [21]. The closest to our work
is a recent study of the PornHub social network [2], although
it did not touch upon age verification.
A number of studies have also looked at online gender
swapping more generally [22]. For example, [23], [24] found
that gender swapping in online gaming is commonplace. The
reasons for such activities have also been explored via sur-
veys [25]. Reasons given include: (i) curiosity and the desire
to experiment; (ii) the perception that the opposite gender is
treated better; and (iii) the belief that playing the opposite
gender will allow new forms of behaviour, or gain advantages.
This complements our own work, although we do not focus on
finding the reasons for users to catfish. Other general work on
identifying deception in online communication include linking
authors across OSNs [26], detecting online personas [27], and
identifying divergent political inclinations [28].
III. METHODOLOGY & DATA
A. Data Collection
PornHub is a video sharing website that allows users to
upload and view adult content, much like YouTube. It also
has a built-in OSN, allowing users to create profiles and
form social connections (friendships and subscriptions) with
each other. They can exchange private messages, upload/share
videos and pictures and post on each others’ “walls”.
We have scraped the associated OSN profiles attached to
PornHub. To initiate the crawl, we used the search facilities
on PornHub to retrieve all users from the 60 largest cities
within the US, as well as 48 capital cities selected around the
world, e.g., Beijing, Berlin, London, Tokyo, etc. Starting from
this seed set, we performed a breadth-first crawl (traversing
friendship links). If not already available, we also collected
the account information for any users who had left a comment
on another user’s wall. In total, we collected 99,727 profiles.
In each profile, where available, we recorded user age, gender,
sexual preference, their “wall” of comments, number of profile
views, number of videos that they have watched, and their
social relationships. Figure 1 presents a sample account from
our data collection showing the information gathered for each
account. User IDs in our collection were anonymised to protect
users’ privacy.
We collect two profile types. The most populated is what
we term “unverified”, which any user can set up without
any pre-requisites (e.g., verification, payment). These accounts
constitute 94.5% of all users. There is, however, a special
form of user account, called “verified”. These accounts have
<USER>
<ID>8423012381</ID>
<TYPE>0</TYPE> <!-- 1 for verified accounts -->
<AGE>27</AGE>
<PROFILE>Girl,Single,Girls,united%states</PROFILE> <!-- gender, status, interested in, 
country -->
<ACTIVITY>7611,202</ACTIVITY> <!-- #videos watched, #posts -->
<FRIENDS>1350,594,76,680</FRIENDS> <!-- #total friends, males, females, others -->
<SUBSCRIBERS>605,246,25,334</SUBSCRIBERS> <!-- same as above -->
<SUBSCRIBEDTO>106,40,7,59</SUBSCRIBEDTO> <!-- same as above -->
<NCOMMENTS>11,10,87,54</NCOMMENTS> <!-- #comments, #unique comments, #words, #unique 
words -->
<COMMENTS>
<comment count=2>thanx sugar</comment>
<comment count=1>I can definitely say the same! You are damn sexy!</comment>
<comment count=1>Awwwww you guys are so sweet to this poor horny girl!!!</comment>
<comment count=1>Thanx you all are real sweet</comment>
<comment count=1>Mmmmmm PLEASE!!!!</comment>
<comment count=1>Well thank you sugar!</comment>
<comment count=1>Ohhh yeah I think I could</comment>
<comment count=1>Heheheehehe thanx sugar!</comment>
<comment count=1>No problem...my pleasure in fact!</comment>
<comment count=1>Damn you are one fine woman!!!! *kiss kiss*</comment>
<comment count=1>GRRRR I NEED SOMEONE XXXXXX MY XXXX AND XXX RIGHT NOW!!!</comment>
</COMMENTS>
</USER>
Fig. 1: A sample account in the collected data. Pornographic terms are replaced by X’s.
been manually validated by PornHub; this involves taking a
picture of oneself with some message that links the individual
to the account (e.g., next to their username). Although not
foolproof, it does lend a far higher level of user trust in profile
details (particularly gender and age) than typical. To increase
our number of verified profiles, we specifically searched for
all verified profiles in the above cities, and scraped their
accounts. Overall, 5.5% of the accounts crawled were verified
(5,484 accounts in total). Despite being a smaller sample
size, verified accounts offer a more reliable view of dedicated
users, providing a form of (partial) ground truth against which
statistics about unverified accounts can be compared. We later
exploit these “ground truth” verified accounts to train models
that can be used to classify the remaining unverified accounts.
B. Limitations & Ethical Considerations
Before continuing, it is important to recognise the limita-
tions of our data. First, we acknowledge that the PornHub user-
base is not necessarily representative of the wider population.
Hence, our results are specific to the PornHub social network.
Second, we later utilise verified profiles to train age and gender
prediction models (for use on unverified profiles). An obvious
possibility is that the verified profiles and unverified profiles
are sufficiently different to make comparability difficult. Sim-
ilarly, deceptive users may actively modify their behaviour to
better reflect their chosen gender and age. Consequently, due
to the lack of a comprehensive ground truth, profiles classified
as catfishes may be susceptible to significant noise. Differences
in population sizes for different demographics (e.g., men vs.
women) may further undermine the results. It is therefore
important to emphasise that results are preliminary and require
validation. We temper all our analysis with this consideration.
Further exploration is a major theme within our future work.
Finally, it is important to note that we are collecting personal
information about a large number of users. Hence, we took
a number of steps to address ethical concerns. We avoided
analysing personally identifiable information, e.g., names. We
also ensured that our methodology did not involve any commu-
nications with the accounts under study. Critically, PornHub
allows users to set their profiles to either public or private. Our
data is exclusively made-up of users who have set their profiles
to public (i.e., anyone can view them). We did not make any
attempt to access private profiles, which would have involved
befriending others.
IV. CHARACTERISING PORNHUB DEMOGRAPHICS
Before exploring the presence of catfishes, we briefly char-
acterise the demographic make-up of PornHub accounts. We
include both verified and unverified accounts in this analysis,
but we ignore accounts labelled as “couple”, “company”,
“transgender”, or “not specified”’ (these collectively make just
4.4% of all accounts) to focus on catfishing in the context of
male and female accounts. Note that we interchangeably use
the terms ‘girl’ / ‘guy’ and female / male as these are the
terms used on the portal.
Figure 2 presents a histogram revealing the number of
accounts of each age. 64% of accounts fall into the 18–
30 bracket, confirming a young demographic. Perhaps more
noteworthy is the distinction between male and female ac-
counts, with female users marginally younger (average of 28
vs. 31). This is driven by a larger population of older male
profiles. This could perhaps be explained by that fact that
younger women have shown greater affinity to pornographic
content (compared to older), whilst men continue to maintain
an interest into older years [29].
As well as being able to stipulate their own gender, profiles
can also list which other gender(s) they are interested in.
Figure 3 presents the number of accounts that stipulate an
interest in each gender (male, female, both). We find that 68%
of accounts are interested in women (bottom middle plot) of
which 90% are heterosexual males, yet only 4.5% of accounts
(top right plot) are females interested in males who could
Fig. 2: Distribution of male and female profiles across age
ranges
Fig. 3: Distribution of male and female users interested in
men, women and both across age ranges
satisfy this need. In fact, female accounts are more likely to
stipulate an interest in both, rather than men alone. In other
words, PornHub suffers from a significant supply-and-demand
mismatch: Female profiles are in high demand, yet only a
small proportion of profiles can satisfy this demand.
To explore this further, we look at the number of friends
garnered per user for both female and male accounts (Fig-
ure 4). Profiles labelled as female consistently obtain larger
social groups than male ones: an average of 396 vs. 185. A
downward trend can also be observed across the age ranges
with younger users gaining more friends, which is again more
pronounced for female accounts. For example, the average 21
year old female accounts gets 433 friends compared to just
176 for a 50 year old female.
One explanation for the above could be that younger users
are more proactive in befriending others. To explore this,
we inspect the number of subscribers for each account type
(these are equivalent to followers on Twitter, i.e., directed
relationships). Again, we see a strong bias towards female
profiles who, on average, have 309 subscribers vs. just 97
for men. Similarly, the number of friends, on average, for
female accounts is 403 vs. 188 for men. Clearly, the subscriber
numbers are primarily driven by the behaviour of other users
(as a user cannot subscribe to themselves). Hence, this adds
Fig. 4: Number of friends per profile vs. reported age
evidence against the claim that young female profiles may get
large social groups simply through proactive befriending other.
In fact, the average female account is subscribed to just 106
channels compared to 142 for male accounts.
In summary, the above confirms a significant difference
between male and female profiles in terms of social popularity
(friendship groups). Our aim is not to speculate on why this is
the case. However, it is clear that these demographic pressures
might create incentives for people to lie about profile details.
Due to this, we spend the rest of the paper exploring the
propensity for users to lie on this social network.
V. DEMOGRAPHIC PREDICTION
To identify deceptive users (catfishes), it is first necessary
to extract and predict profile features that indicate true demo-
graphics. To do this, we utilise PornHub’s verified profiles;
these are profiles that have been independently verified by
PornHub. Although an assumption, these are significantly
more trustworthy than non-verified accounts, since they must
pass a process of validation by the website.
We use the verified profile data as a training set for building
models for age estimation and gender prediction. Models are
then used to estimate the demographics of the unverified
accounts and compare them to the claimed ones. It is worth
noting that verified users may exhibit different characteristics
(e.g., activity level, sexual preferences, education level) to their
unverified equivalents, thereby making their use within the
classifier less accurate. To mitigate this, we only identify users
as catfishes when they exhibit a significant disparity to their
predicted demographics. Regardless, we emphasise that the
lack of a ground truth means that our results should only be
treated as a first-stage analysis.
A. Feature Extraction
First, a set of features is extracted for training a regression
model for age estimation and a classifier for gender prediction.
Many features are inspired by the state-of-the-art [3], [4], [13];
however, we also introduce a set of novel features that are
specific to our data. The set of feature groups extracted from
the data set are as follows:
Content features: The comments collected for each user’s
profile are used for generating a set of features. Some of
the content features are inspired by [3], while we introduce
an additional one to measure text formality based on the
comments nature on such website:
Features Female Male Macro F1 Accuracy
R P F1 R P F1
Content 0.542 0.885 0.672 0.974 0.854 0.910 0.791 0.859
Network 0.702 0.847 0.768 0.954 0.898 0.925 0.846 0.887
All 0.769 0.920 0.838 0.976 0.921 0.947 0.893 0.920
TABLE I: Gender prediction performance
• Comments-content: a set of features representing the
bag-of-words (BOW) by each user, where each term
represents a binary feature that is set to 1 if appeared
in the user’s comments and zero otherwise.
• Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC): a set
of features representing the percentage of terms used in
user’s comments that have a given LIWC category [30].
This includes: emotions, questions, self reference, family
reference etc. This set of features should show the nature
of terms used by a given user, where it might be a good
indication of the user’s age and/or gender.
• Comments count: This includes, (i) number of com-
ments by the user; (ii) percentage of unique comments,
as we noticed many users repeats their exact comments
on different posts; and (iii) vocabulary variety, which is
the number of unique terms used by the user divided by
the total length of comments.
• Comments-formality: One behaviour that young genera-
tions are commonly characterised by is the usage of slang,
including shortcuts and abbreviations (e.g., “gr8”, “thx”).
We introduced a feature to measure the percentage of
informal language in users’ comments. To detect informal
text, we used the Xerox part of speech (POS) tagger2
to label POS tags of terms in comments. Terms with
an undefined tag were considered informal language.
We found this approach to be accurate in many cases.
However, we noticed that some users use non-English
terms. Thus, we applied the same POS tagger for three
languages: English, French, and German. Those terms
that obtained undefined tags with all three languages
were considered informal. Finally, the feature value is
the number of informal terms divided by the comments
length.
Network features: Another set of features were extracted to
represent non-textual information. Most of these features are
dependent on the network characteristics of PornHub, which
contains more information on individuals than other general
social websites. These features are:
• Profile: including a user’s country, status (single / in a
relationship), and interested in (men / women / both).
• Activity: numbers of videos watched and posted (in log
scale).
• Network: Numbers of friends, subscribers, and sub-
scribed to (in log scale). In addition, percentage of males
2https://open.xerox.com/Services/fst-nlp-tools/
and females in each of these lists.3
Using the above features, we perform gender and age pre-
diction to identify discrepancies, where users may be exhibit-
ing anomalous behaviour for their stipulated demographics.
B. Gender Prediction
For gender prediction, we train a support vector machine
(SVM) binary classifier [31] using the above features of the
verified accounts. The created model allows us to then classify
the remaining unverified accounts.
To measure the performance of the built classifier, we used
10-fold cross validation on the verified set. We only focused
on the verified accounts with at least 10 comments in their
profile to avoid training the classifier with samples of sparse
content features. The number of verified accounts with 10+
comments are 1,231 out of which only 1,119 accounts had
their gender identified. Numbers of males and females are 820
and 299 respectively. Precision, recall, and F-measure were
calculated for each gender separately; then macro-F-measure
and accuracy were calculated for the overall performance.
Different combinations of the feature groups were tested to
find the most effective features. Table I reports the results
for gender prediction on the verified accounts. As shown,
network features are more effective than content features in
predicting user’s gender. This is driven by the differences
seen in the popularity of the two genders (§IV). However,
when combining content and network features, significantly
better accuracy (92%) is achieved. We note that the classifier
is more effective in predicting males than females, which
is expected since male training samples are almost three
times than of female samples. This also means the impact
of inacurracy will be inflated for female users pretending to
be male. Nevertheless, we believe this still constitutes a good
first step.
C. Age Estimation
The same set of features has been used for age estimation.
We applied two regression techniques for age estimation;
namely, SVM regression4 and deep neural networks (DNNs).
We have examined different models for SVM, including linear
and polynomial regressions. As for the neural network ap-
proach, we designed a multi-layered perceptron (MLP) trained
3Note that this feature should not be used in isolation, as it is partly a
product of how others react to the profile’s reported demographics (a female
account is likely to attract more attention even if it is fake).
4http://svmlight.joachims.org/
Features MAE Correlation
Content 5.581 0.509
Network 6.119 0.234
All 5.783 0.440
TABLE II: Age estimation performance (SVM)
to do regression over all the possible age values. The neural
network had 3 hidden layers of rectified linear unit (ReLU)
activated neurons each. This means the activation function for
each neuron was of the form f(x) = max(0, x)
Our experimentation showed that SVM linear regression
achieved the most effective results when compared to the
other non-linear SVM regression models and DNNs. Actually,
DNNs showed the poorest performance, which could be ex-
plained by over-fitting. Unlike SVMs that are resilient to over-
fitting because of their regularization techniques, DNNs are
highly susceptible to over-fitting, especially in situations where
feature dimensionality exceeds training dataset size. This is
because of exponentially higher number of free parameters.
We therefore utilise SVM.
Similar to what we performed in gender prediction, 10-fold
cross-validation was applied on the verified accounts with 10+
comments to evaluate the effectiveness of the features and
regression techniques. All the 1,231 verified accounts with
10+ comments were used, where the input for training the
regression models was the extracted features set, and the label
is the declared age by the verified account. We normalized ages
over 60 to “60+” in order to reduce the sparsity for these ages.
For measuring the performance, we followed the same method
applied in literature [3], [12], [4], where Pearson’s correlation
and mean absolute error (MAE) between estimated age and
actual age are measured.
The best result we achieved with DNNs was a correlation
of 0.28 and MAE of 6.8 years. This is much lower than
the best results achieved with SVMs. Table II shows the ob-
tained MAE and correlation using different features set when
applying SVM linear regression model for age estimation.
Unlike gender detection, network features are not effective
for age estimation. Actually, it degrades the performance of
content features when added to it. Content features from
users’ comments are the most effective as shown in the table.
The model can estimate the age of an account holder from
his/her comments with an error of ±5 years on average. The
correlation between estimated ages and actual ones is 0.51.
This result compares well with the state-of-the-art methods
on other data sets [3].5
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Next, we utilise our classifiers to explore the unverified
users who are classified as potential catfishes. We consider
a catfish to be either: (i) a user who is classified as having
a gender different to the one reported; or (ii) a user with
5The best result for age estimation achieved in [3] for medical blog users
was a correlation of 0.535 and 6.537 MAE
Fig. 5: The age breakdown for users who lie about their gender
(left) and those who don’t (right).
Fig. 6: The probability density function of difference between
estimated and reported user age, broken down for female and
male accounts.
a predicted age that is more than 5.581 years6 different
than their claimed age. Of course, this definition would also
identify some verified accounts as catfishes in the case of
classification errors. Consequently, we emphasise that our
analysis highlights users who are potentially catfishes — it
is not a ground truth. Hence, our classifiers should only be
used for raising flags for applying additional vetting for users
with suspicious behaviour.
For consistency, only unverified accounts with more than 10
comments were considered in our analysis, since our models
were trained in the same way. The number of unverified ac-
counts with 10+ comments included in our upcoming analysis
is 11,182.
A. Who catfishes?
We start by inspecting the number of accounts that are
classified as lying about their gender. Figure 5 shows the
number of catfishes of either gender and in each age range
(compared to the number of users classified as honest). Note
that in Figure 5, the gender refers to the reported gender
listed on the profile (not the one that was predicted by our
classifier). A key observation emerges from Figure 5 — a
larger proportion of female users pretend to be men. Just
35.1% of male accounts are classified as catfishes compared
to 60.7% for women. Although this sounds high, it is roughly
equivalent to prior questionnaire-based results (48% [1]). It is
also worth noting that a similar observation has been made
in online gaming [23], [24]. A major reason for this was the
perception that men are treated differently; we conjecture a
6Our model achieves a MAE of 5.581. Thus, we cannot consider catfishes
who only marginally change their age.
Fig. 7: Reported age of accounts lying about their age, broken
down by gender.
similar motive could be at play here. We should also note that
this may be driven by classifier errors caused by the disparity
in male vs. female sample sizes; exploring this is a major line
of our future work.
We also inspect accounts that are classified as lying about
their age. Figure 6 presents the difference between reported
and predicted ages. It can be seen that catfish accounts reported
as male (right) tend to select a marginally younger age, but
also experiment with far older age ranges. In contrast, catfish
accounts reported as female more consistently select younger
ages. The average age of a male catfish is 38.15, but just 34.87
for female catfish. This can clearly be seen in Figure 7, which
presents a histogram of the reported ages for the accounts
classified as catfishes: Male catfish profiles are more likely
to be older than female catfish profiles. This tendency is
conducive with common social theory; studies have shown
that women are generally interested in same-aged to somewhat
older men, whereas men exhibit preferences towards younger
women [32]. Hence, it seems likely that men pretending to be
women would select young ages, whilst women pretending to
be men would select from a wider range of ages.
B. What are the benefits of catfishing?
An obvious question is what drives users to catfish. Al-
though there are many potential reasons, we have previously
hypothesised that frustrated (unpopular) users may catfish in
an attempt to gain more attention (§IV). This can be measured
using the profile view counter listed on each profile, as
well as the number of friends a profile garners. To inspect
this, Figure 8 plots the number of views vs. the number of
friends. Profiles are separated into those classified as catfishes
(false) and honest (true) users. It can be seen that honest
(true) female accounts gain by far the most profile views
and friend relationships. As the number of views increase,
so does the number of friends. On average, female users have
32,150 views and 444 friends. More interesting, however, is
comparing these against users classified as catfishes. Male
catfishes, i.e., male users with a female account (red line in the
right plot), do substantially better and mirror the popularity of
women (16590 views and 314 friends on average). In contrast,
the average view count for truthful male profiles is just 6098,
while they gain only 195 friends. Such observations shed light
on a potential motivation of a male catfish. The situation
Fig. 8: Number of Profile Views for profiles with false and true
genders (smoothed with 95% confidence interval). We use the
classifier to separate accounts into male and female (rather
than using the reported gender).
Fig. 9: The number of friends per account as a proxy gain for
lying about gender, broken down by gender and interest.
is very different for female catfish, i.e., women pretending
to be men (red line in the left plot), who gain far fewer
views and friends than their honest counterparts (8719 and 151
respectively). This is because, to other users, they will appear
to be men — clearly this raises further challenges regarding
the classification process.
C. What do catfishes want?
We can also decompose the profiles into accounts interested
in each option (men, women, both). This allows us to see what
profiles classified as catfishes are typically seeking. Figure 9
plots the number of friends each account accumulated based
on the user’s age. It also breaks down users based on what
they stipulate they are interested in. It can be seen that very
few male profiles register an interest in both genders (8.0%),
whilst this is significantly higher for female accounts (60.5%).
We conjecture this might be because females choose to catfish
so that they can experiment with other women whilst also
interacting with men, whilst men choose to catfish primarily so
they can overcome the difficulty of befriending women. Hence,
male catfishes tend to lie about being homosexual women;
these are actually the users who gain the most (in terms of
increased friendship sizes). This is especially the case for men
aged 30-55 years (red line in top middle plot), who tend to
do quite poorly when being truthful.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this preliminary study, we have explored the behaviour
and characteristics of users in a major Porn 2.0 social net-
work. Our focus has been on understanding the roles of age
and gender, exploiting state-of-the-art algorithms to try and
detect users who potentially lie about these features: so called
“catfishes”. To achieve our goal, we built classifiers for gender
and age estimation. Again, the predictions remain unverified
by a ground truth and we therefore temper our findings with
this consideration. The classifier suggested a number of trends,
e.g., that women actually have a greater propensity to lie than
men. The classifier also suggested that the two genders tend to
select different ages when catfishing. Whereas men pretending
to be women usually select younger ages, women pretending
to be men select from a wider range.
This work is just the first step towards understanding the
nature of online catfishing. Here, we have only explored decep-
tion related to age and gender. Our future work will expand this
to understand how some users lie about other attributes such as
location and interests. We also plan to use machine learning to
better model the similarities between some male and female
accounts (e.g., based on browsing patterns [33]). The most
important priority is confirming our findings via ground truth
information (e.g., from surveys and questionnaires). This is
because it is currently impossible to gain definitive data
beyond the verified profiles. Our method is thus underpinned
by the assumption that there is limited catfishing related to
gender and age in verified profiles. We acknowledge that this
assumption likely contains flaws, thereby introducing noise to
our findings. That said, we argue that this is the first significant
dataset to allow such exploration. The classifier also assumes
that the truthful underlying attributes of unverified profiles
are similar to that of verified profiles. This too needs much
more testing before the results can be considered conclusive.
Finally, we wish to understand why users choose to lie, and
how individual users strategise this deception. Again, we plan
to execute this via surveys that can garner deeper insight into
such reasoning.
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